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Abstract
We investigate whether peer punishment is an e¢ cient mechanism for enforcing coop-
eration in an experiment with a long time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that
the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benets of higher coopera-
tion, if (i) there is a su¢ ciently long time horizon and (ii) punishment cannot be
avenged. However, in most instances in daily life, when individuals interact for an
extended period of time, punishment can be retaliated. We use a design that imposes
minimal restrictions on who can punish whom or when, and allows participants to
employ a wide range of punishment strategies including retaliation of punishment.
Similar to previous research, we nd that, when punishment cannot be avenged, peer
punishment leads to higher earnings relative to a baseline treatment without any pun-
ishment opportunities. However, in the more general setting, we nd no evidence of
group earnings increasing over time relative to the baseline treatment. Our results
raise questions under what conditions peer punishment can be an e¢ cient mechanism
for enforcing cooperation.
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"In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless
a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is past
the ocean is at again."
John Maynard Keynes (1923)
1 Introduction
Is peer punishment an e¢ cient mechanism for establishing cooperation when private and
public interest are at odds? This question has been the focus of numerous studies since the
seminal works of Ostrom et al. (1992) and Fehr and Gächter (2000). These authors were
the rst to show that many individuals are willing to incur a cost to punish free riders,
even if they cannot anticipate any material benets from their actions. While the threat of
peer punishment has been shown to have a positive impact on cooperation rates, its overall
impact on e¢ ciency is less clear due to the costs associated with punishment.
Gächter et al. (2008) noted that, although group earnings are often lower when peer
punishment is permitted (e.g., Ostrom et al., 1992; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Fehr and Gächter,
2000, 2002; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008), they tend to increase over the course of
these experiments as cooperation rates rise and the need for punishment decreases. This
suggests that, in the long run, the benets of higher cooperation would outweigh the costs
of punishment. In line with this, Gächter et al. (2008) showed that peer punishment
opportunities can increase both cooperation levels and group earnings in an experiment
in which individuals interact in xed groups for an extended time horizon (50 periods).
However, an important feature of the experiment by Gächter et al. (2008) is that the set of
punishment strategies available to individuals is limited. In particular, individuals are given
only a single opportunity in each period to punish anonymously other group members.
The present study contributes to this literature by examining whether peer punishment
can increase group earnings in an environment that allows for a rich, realistic set of pun-
ishment strategies. The experiment imposes minimal restrictions on who can punish whom
and when, and allows participantsactions to determine the duration of a single period
of the game. This implies that individuals can punish free riders, counter-punish, punish
non-punishers, punish counter-punishers, delay punishment to observe the actions of oth-
ers, and more. Investigating the e¢ cacy of peer punishment in such a set up is interesting
for two reasons. First, at least some of the punishment strategies mentioned above have
been shown to play an important role both in the lab (e.g., Denant-Boemont et al., 2007;
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Nikiforakis, 2008; Nikiforakis et al., 2012) and in the eld (Balafoutas and Nikiforakis,
2012; Guala, 2012). Second, recent evolutionary models suggest that peer punishment is
less likely to lead to increases in group earnings in environments that allow for such a rich
set of punishment strategies, even in the long run (Boyd et al., 2010; Janssen and Bushman,
2008; Rand et al., 2010; Rand and Nowak, 2011).
The experiment consists of three experimental treatments. In the No Punishment treat-
ment, individuals play the standard linear public-good game without punishment opportu-
nities for 30 periods.1 At the start of each period, individuals are given identical endowments
and must decide how much to contribute to a group account. Contributions increase group
earnings, but reduce private earnings. In the Standard Punishment treatment, individuals
play a linear public-good game with punishment opportunities that resembles the set up in
Gächter et al. (2008). In particular, after observing the contribution of each group member,
individuals can reduce each others earnings by assigning costly punishment points. While
group composition remains the same, "meta-strategies" that use punishment in response to
actions in previous periods are prevented by providing group members with new identica-
tion numbers at the start of each period. Finally, the Rich Punishment treatment follows
the design of Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011). In this treatment, new punishment stages
are entered as long as punishment is meted out and individuals are in the position to con-
tinue punishing others. This implies that individuals may use none or several punishment
stages in each period.2
Similar to Gächter et al. (2008), we nd that, when punishers are anonymous and
there is a single punishment opportunity in each period, peer punishment eventually leads
to higher earnings relative to the No Punishment treatment. However, when a rich set
of punishment strategies is available, in line with the predictions of the aforementioned
evolutionary models, we nd no evidence of group earnings increasing over time relative to
the No Punishment treatment. This is despite the fact that cooperation levels are similar
in the Standard and Rich Punishment treatments. The reason is that some individuals
engage in feuding.3 As a result, punishment expenditure shows no sign of declining over
1We decided to use a shorter time horizon than Gächter et al. (2008) as allowing for a rich set of
punishment strategies can increase considerably the duration of the experiment. We chose to allow for 30
periods based on the evidence in Gächter et al. (2008), which indicates that 30 periods should su¢ ce for
the benets of punishment to outweigh its costs.
2The two most important di¤erences between our study and Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011) are that
(i) in our previous study we did not consider behavior in a treatment without punishment opportunities
and thus could not address our present research question, and (ii) that we considered a shorter time horizon
(10 periods) than we do here, which also prevented us from studying long-run e¤ects of the availability of
complex punishment strategies.
3The word "feud" is typically used in the literature to refer to a situation in which two or more parties
are involved in a sequence of retaliatory actions over an extended period of time, which sometimes lead to
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Treatment No. of punishment stages SubjectsID No. of groups
No Punishment (NP) 0 Fixed 10
Standard Punishment (SP) 1 Random 10
Rich Punishment (RP)  1, Endogenous Fixed 10
Table 1: Overview of the experimental treatments
time. Our results therefore raise questions about whether peer punishment can be an
e¢ cient mechanism for enforcing cooperation, even in the long run.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next session we present the experi-
mental design. In Section 3 we present the results from our experiment. Section 4 concludes
by discussing the implication of our results.
2 The Experiment
2.1 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of three treatments. The design of the treatments follows that
used in previous public-good experiments with peer punishment. We discuss each of the
treatments in sequence. Table 1 summarizes the experimental design.
2.1.1 The Rich Punishment treatment
This treatment is similar to the LF treatment in Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011). The
game is divided into a number of stages. The rst stage is a standard public good game.
Four players simultaneously decide how much of their initial endowment of 20 Experimental
Currency Units (ECU) to contribute to a group account. Contributions are multiplied by
1.6 and then distributed equally among the four players. Hence, the marginal per capita
return is 1:6=4 = 0:4. If the playerscontributions are ci; i = 1; :::; 4; player is earnings
after the contribution stage are given by
0i = 20  ci + 0:4
4X
h=1
ch:
killings. This is one reason we chose to use Keynes famous quote in our title. Another reason we used
Keynesquote is the recent discussion on the long-run benets of peer punishment. We do acknowledge
that, had Keynes been still alive, he may have felt that we have quoted him somewhat out of context. At
the same time, however, we hope he would have found our title appropriate and perhaps even entertaining.
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The contribution stage is followed by a number of punishment stages. In each punish-
ment stage s, player i can assign punishment points to group member j, psij, as long as
s 1i > 0 and 
s 1
j  0. Assigning a punishment point costs the punishing player 1 ECU
and the punished player 3 ECU.4 Only integer numbers of points can be assigned and the
maximum total number of points a player can assign is equal to his current payo¤. That
is,
P4
j=1;j 6=i p
s
ij  s 1i . No restrictions were imposed on the number of punishment points
a player could receive. Player is earnings at the end of punishment stage s are, therefore,
given by
si = 
s 1
i   3 
4X
j=1;j 6=i
psji  
4X
j=1;j 6=i
psij:
The number of punishment stages in the Rich Punishment treatment is not restricted
ex-ante, but is endogenously determined. A period ends if no punishment is meted out
in a given stage or if further punishment is not permitted. Punishment in stage s is not
permitted if s 1i  0; for all i 2 [1; 4], or if at least three players cannot be assigned any
further punishment (that is, their earnings in the current period are already negative).5 The
fact that punishment is restricted to integers ensures that a period will end after nitely
many punishment stages (namely a maximum of 34), a fact subjects were not informed
about, but could have calculated.
At the start of the rst punishment stage, players are informed about the contribu-
tions to the group account of each group member. In further punishment stages, every
player is informed about the number of points assigned by each individual player to each
of the players in the previous punishment stage. This enables a wide range of punishment
strategies. For example, individuals can engage in peer punishment, counter-punish, punish
non-punishers, delay punishment, or punish otherscounter-punishers.
The game is repeated 30 times and group composition remains unchanged. At the start
of the experiment, each group member is given an identication number that stays the
same throughout the experiment. This implies that counter-punishment cannot be avoided
(except in the nal period) because even if a player cannot counter-punish in a given period
if his payo¤ is already negative or zero, he can still do so in a later period. As we discuss in
Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011), we believe that this is a realistic feature of interactions
4In Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011), one punishment point reduced the income of the target by 2
ECU. For the purpose of comparison, in this experiment we chose to use the same punishment e¤ectiveness
as Gächter et al. (2008) instead.
5Note that player i with s 1i = 0 can be punished although he cannot punish. This ensures that a
player cannot immunize himself against retaliation by spending all his income on punishing others.
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occurring outside the laboratory, especially over an extended time period.6 Even in the
extreme case that one exterminates ones prime opponent, a friend, colleague or family
member of the victim can take revenge.
2.1.2 The No Punishment treatment
The purpose of this treatment is to provide a benchmark against which to evaluate whether
the existence of punishment opportunities in the Rich Punishment treatment leads to higher
group earnings. The game is the same as in the Rich Punishment treatment, but punish-
ment of any kind is not permitted. Individuals only have to decide how much to contribute
to the group account. After making this decision, individuals are informed of the con-
tribution of the other group members to the group account and their earnings from the
period.
Similar to the Rich Punishment treatment, the game is repeated 30 times. Group
composition remains unchanged, as do the identication numbers that are assigned to
group members at the start of the experiment.
2.1.3 The Standard Punishment treatment
This treatment is similar to the P50 treatment in Gächter et al. (2008). The game consists
of two stages: a contribution stage and a punishment stage. In particular, after making
their contribution to the group account, individuals are informed about the contribution of
their group members and must decide whether, and by how much, they wish to reduce the
earnings of each other. Contributions to the group account and punishment have the same
payo¤ implications as in the Rich Punishment treatment.
As in Gächter et al. (2008) group composition remains unchanged throughout the exper-
iment, but the identication number of each group member changes randomly at the start
of each period. This implies that individuals cannot use "meta-strategies" such as counter-
punishment, punishment of non-punishers etc., across periods. The game is repeated 30
times. While subjects in Gächter et al. (2008) played the game for 50 periods, their data
suggests that 30 periods should su¢ ce for the benets of higher cooperation to o¤set the
costs of punishment.
6See Balafoutas and Nikiforakis (2012) for evidence from a natural eld experiment on costly punishment
showing that the fear of counter-punishment is an important deterrent to punishing norm violations in one-
shot interactions.
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2.2 Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Experimental Economics Laboratory at the Univer-
sity of Melbourne using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited using ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004). A total of 120 subjects participated in the experiment. We ran two sessions
for each treatment. The rst session consisted of four groups of four individuals each, while
the second session consisted of six groups of four individuals. Thus we had 10 indepen-
dent groups in each treatment. Participants were students at the University of Melbourne
from various disciplines. None of the subjects had previously participated in a public good
experiment or had experience with game theory.
Written instructions (including a set of control questions) were handed out at the begin-
ning of the experiment. The experiment started only after all subjects answered the control
questions correctly. Sessions lasted between 90 and 130 minutes. Following previous stud-
ies, (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gächter et al., 2008; Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2011,
Nikiforakis et al., 2012), subjects in the Standard Punishment treatment received an initial
capital of 25 ECU to cover any losses due to punishment. Given the rich set of punishment
strategies, subjects in the Rich Punishment treatment received a one-o¤ payment of 125
ECU, while subjects in the No Punishment treatment did not receive any initial capital.
Participants were paid in cash at the end of the experiment with earnings calculated at
an exchange rate of 1 ECU = 6 Australian cents. Average earnings excluding the initial
capital were approximately A$ 43.56. At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate
between the Australian and the US dollar was approximately 1.
3 Experimental Results
We start by considering contributions to the public good in our three treatments. We
observe:
Result 1: Contributions are higher when punishment opportunities exist. Contributions
are not signicantly di¤erent in the Rich Punishment and Standard Punishment treatments.
SUPPORT: Figure 1 presents the evolution of average contributions over the course of the
experiment in each treatment. Panel A in Table 2 presents the average contribution in each
treatment across all periods as well as in the rst and second half of the experiment, while
Panel B o¤ers pairwise statistical comparisons of contributions across treatments based on
non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests using the average in each group as an independent
observation. As can be seen, the opportunity to punish other group members sustains
contributions at intermediate levels in both the Rich Punishment (12.63) and Standard
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Figure 1: Evolution of average contribution across periods
Panel A: Average contribution
Treatment All Periods Periods 1-15 Periods 16-30
No Punishment (NP) 5.17 5.89 4.45
Standard Punishment (SP) 13.54 12.33 14.76
Rich Punishment (RP) 12.63 12.74 12.53
Panel B: Statistical comparison (Mann-Whitney, two-sided, p values)
Treatment comparison All Periods Periods 1-15 Periods 16-30
NP SP 0.0032 0.0191 0.0051
NP RP 0.0311 0.0283 0.0963
SP RP 0.8206 0.9397 0.5961
Table 2: Contributions across treatments
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Punishment (13.54) treatments. Contributions are signicantly higher both in the Rich
Punishment treatment and in the Standard Punishment treatment than in the No Pun-
ishment treatment at the 5%-level in the rst half of the experiment. In the second half,
contributions in the Rich Punishment treatment are only signicantly higher than in the
No Punishment treatment at the 10%-level, but in the Standard Punishment treatment
they are signicantly higher than in the No Punishment treatment at the 1%-level.
Average contributions are nearly identical in the rst half of the Standard Punish-
ment and the Rich Punishment treatment but diverge slightly over time. However, neither
the slight decrease in the Rich Punishment treatment is signicant (Wilcoxon signrank,
two-sided, p value = 0:7989), nor the increase in the Standard Punishment treatment
(Wilcoxon signrank, two-sided, p value = 0:1394), nor the di¤erence between the two
treatments in the second half (p value = 0:5961).7 Therefore, allowing individuals to
choose from a richer set of punishment strategies does not a¤ect contributions substantially
or signicantly in the experiment. Our main interest, however, does not lie in contributions,
but in overall earnings, which take into account punishment costs.
Result 2: Group earnings increase over time in the Standard Punishment treatment, but
not in the Rich Punishment treatment. Consequently, while earnings are signicantly higher
in the second half of the experiment in the Standard Punishment than in the No Punishment
treatment, we nd no signicant di¤erence between the earnings in the Rich Punishment
and No Punishment treatments in the second part of the experiment, even in the last periods.
SUPPORT: Figure 2 presents the evolution of group earnings across periods in the Standard
Punishment treatment and the Rich Punishment treatment relative to the No Punishment
treatment. Over time, earnings are decreasing signicantly in theNo Punishment treatment
(Spearman,  =  0:5926, p value< 0:0001) and are increasing in the Standard Punishment
treatment (Spearman,  = 0:7499, p value < 0:0001). Earnings show only a very slight
and insignicant upward trend in the Rich Punishment treatment (Spearman,  = 0:2458,
p value = 0:1904). Panel A in Table 3 presents the average group earnings in the rst
and second half of the experiment in each treatment, and Panel B compares statistically
earnings across treatments. While earnings are similar in the rst half of the experiment in
the Standard and No Punishment treatments (23.55 and 23.53, respectively), earnings are
substantially and signicantly higher in the Standard Punishment treatment than in the No
Punishment treatment in the second half of the experiment (27.69 and 22.67, respectively,
p value = 0:0283). This is not only due to the divergence in contributions discussed
above, but also due to a substantial decrease in punishment from the rst to the second
7The observed decline in contributions in the second half of the experiment in the No Punishment
treatment is weakly statistically signicant (Wilcoxon signrank, two-sided, p value=0.0926).
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Panel A: Average earnings
Treatment All Periods Periods 1-15 Periods 16-30
No Punishment (NP) 23.10 23.53 22.67
Standard Punishment (SP) 25.62 23.55 27.69
Rich Punishment (RP) 23.00 23.45 24.34
Panel B: Statistical comparison (Mann-Whitney, two-sided, p values)
Treatment comparison All Periods Periods 1-15 Periods 16-30
NP SP 0.1508 0.7055 0.0283
NP RP 0.8798 0.8206 0.8798
SP RP 0.5967 0.8798 0.3250
Table 3: Earnings across treatments
half in the Standard Punishment treatment (as will be shown below). We thus replicate the
nding of Gächter et al. (2008).8 In the Rich Punishment treatment, in contrast, despite
the small increase in average earnings in the second half of the experiment relative to the No
Punishment treatment (24.34 and 22.67, respectively), earnings are still not signicantly
di¤erent even in the second half (p value = 0:8798).
One may wonder whether the absence of a signicant di¤erence in the earnings in the
Rich Punishment and No Punishment treatments is a result of comparing earnings across
the whole second half of the experiment. In order to check whether the small di¤erence
observed is signicant if we consider a smaller set of periods, Table 4 presents the results of a
regression analysis (with group-level random e¤ects) where the 30 periods of the experiment
are divided into groups of ve periods.9 The dependent variable is the prot of an individual
in a given period. The independent variables include dummies for periods 1-5, 6-10, 11-
15, 16-20, and 21-25 (the omitted category is 26-30), as well as interaction terms of the
treatment dummies for the Standard Punishment (SP) and the Rich Punishment (RP)
treatments and these period dummies. The period dummies thus measure the di¤erences
between blocks of periods in the No Punishment treatment, while the interaction e¤ects
measure the di¤erence between the respective treatment and the No Punishment treatment
in the respective block of periods.
The results in Table 4 reveal the following. First, as mentioned, there is a progressive
8Despite the shorter time horizon in our experiment, the average di¤erence in earnings across all periods
between the Standard Punishment and No Punishment treatments is similar in our experiment and that
in Gächter et al. (2.52 and 2.98, respectively).
9We do not model period as a linear e¤ect as this assumption is clearly refuted by the evidence seen in
Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Evolution of earnings across periods relative to the No Punishment treatment
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Coe¢ cient Standard Error p value
First 5 3.792 0.6853 0.000
Second 5 1.482 0.6853 0.031
Third 5 1.356 0.6853 0.048
Fourth 5 2.382 0.6853 0.001
Fifth 5 1.659 0.6853 0.015
SP  First 5  2:862 2.1969 0.193
SP  Second 5 0.722 2.1969 0.742
SP  Third 5 2.186 2.1969 0.320
SP  Fourth 5 3.708 2.1969 0.091
SP  Fifth 5 5.42 2.1969 0.014
SP  Sixth 5 5.944 2.1969 0.007
RP  First 5  2:98 2.1969 0.175
RP  Second 5 1.357 2.1969 0.537
RP  Third 5 1.387 2.1969 0.528
RP  Fourth 5 2.057 2.1969 0.349
RP  Fifth 5  0:213 2.1969 0.923
RP  Sixth 5 3.157 2.1969 0.151
Constant 21.323 1.5534 0.000
Table 4: Regression of earnings over time, with random e¤ects at the group level. "First
5" refers to periods 1-5, "Second 5" refers to periods "6-10" and so on. The dependent
variable is the earnings of an individual in a given period. Number of observations: 3600.
reduction in earnings in the No Punishment treatment over time due to the declining
contributions. Second, earnings are signicantly higher (at least at the 10% level) in the
Standard Punishment treatment than in the No Punishment treatment from periods 16-20
onwards. Third and most importantly, we do not nd any evidence of an increasing tendency
in earnings in the Rich Punishment treatment relative to the No Punishment treatment. In
particular, the interaction terms of the Rich Punishment treatment and period dummies are
always insignicant and often change signs. To further our understanding of the comparison
of earnings, we take a closer look at punishment behavior.
Result 3: The total number of punishment points assigned in the Rich Punishment and
Standard Punishment treatments is not signicantly di¤erent. However, while punishment
declines substantially and signicantly over time in the Standard Punishment treatment, this
is not the case in the Rich Punishment treatment where punishment remains at substantial
levels even in the second half of the experiment.
SUPPORT: Table 5 presents the number of punishment points assigned across all stages
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Treatment All Periods Periods 1-15 Periods 16-30
Standard Punishment (SP) 0.63 0.96 0.29
Rich Punishment (RP) (Total number of points across stages) 0.92 1.05 0.80
First-stage punishment (RP) 0.54 0.60 0.48
Higher-stage punishment (RP) 0.38 0.44 0.31
Table 5: Punishment points assigned across treatments
in the rst and second half of the experiment in each treatment. As can be seen, the
average number of points across periods and stages is 39.7% higher in the Rich Punish-
ment treatment. Nevertheless, this di¤erence is not statistically signicant due to the high
variance across groups (Mann-Whitney, two-sided, p value = 0:9698). Figure 3 presents
the evolution of the average number of punishment points assigned over the course of the
experiment in the two treatments with punishment opportunities.10 The gure illustrates
that the extent of punishment is similar in the early rounds across the two treatments.
However, while punishment declines considerably over time in the Standard Punishment
treatment (Spearman,  =  0:7078, p value < 0:0001), it remains at fairly high levels in
the Rich Punishment treatment (Spearman,  =  0:2961, p value < 0:1121).11 , 12
In summary, the data indicates that a long time horizon does not guarantee that peer
punishment will improve e¢ ciency in an environment with rich punishment strategies. Most
importantly, we nd no evidence of earnings increasing over time in the Rich Punishment
treatment relative to the No Punishment treatment, implying that this nding is likely to
hold up in experiments with even longer time horizons. The fact that there is a substantial
10Figure 3 graphs the total number of points assigned across stages in the Rich Punishment treatment
as well as the number of points assigned in the rst punishment stage of this treatment. The reason
is that rst-stage punishment is typically aimed towards below-average contributors, while higher-order
punishment is often used to retaliate punishment (Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2011). This allows the
reader to evaluate the relative extent to which higher-order punishment is observed. (Remember that there
is only one punishment stage in the Standard Punishment treatment.)
11While the average number of points is nearly 3 times greater in the second half of the experiment
in the Rich Punishment than in the Standard Punishment treatment, the di¤erence remains statistically
insignicant (Mann-Whitney, two-sided, p value = 0:6182). This indicates that a small subset of groups
is investing heavily in punishment in the Rich Punishment treatment.
12Note that the number of punishment points declines by approximately 70% in the second half of the
experiment in the Standard Punishment treatment. This reduction is marginally statistically signicant
(Wilcoxon signrank, two-sided, p value=0.0593). While the reduction of overall punishment in the Rich
Punishment treatment is statistically signicant (Wilcoxon signrank, two-sided, p value=0.0367), it is sub-
stantially smaller (approximately 25%) than the decline in the Standard Punishment treatment. Moreover,
the signicance of this reduction relies critically on the cut-o¤point. For example, if we compare the average
number of points in periods 1-16 and 17-30 the di¤erence is far from being signicant (Wilcoxon signrank,
two-sided, p value=0.3329). Similarly, if we compare the average number of points in periods 1-20 and
21-30 the di¤erence is also stastistically insignicant (Wilcoxon signrank, two-sided, p value=0.7213).
13
Figure 3: Evolution of average number of punishment points assigned across periods
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amount of punishment cannot be attributed to di¤erent levels of cooperation, as can be seen
in Figure 1. Instead, the high levels of punishment are attributable mostly to two groups
engaged in feuding. To keep our paper focused on our main research question, we refrain
from presenting a more detailed analysis of punishment behavior here. However, we note,
that the punishment patterns we observe in the present experiment are similar to those
reported in Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011). For example, free riders are signicantly
less punished in the rst stage of punishment in the Rich Punishment treatment than in the
Standard Punishment treatment. One di¤erence is that in the present study we do observe
some feuds occurring over an extended period of time in two groups in the Rich Punishment
treatment. Individuals in these groups invest signicant amounts of money in punishing
others as can be seen by the peaks in periods 20-23 in Figure 3. As a result, although the
number of points assigned in the rst punishment stage in the Rich Punishment treatment
is higher than the number of points assigned in later punishment stages (Table 5: 0.54 vs.
0.38), the di¤erence is not statistically signicant (Wilcoxon signrank, two-sided, p value
= 0:1394). The greater incidence of feuds in the present study may be related to the
longer-time horizon.
A possible concern for the assessment of the welfare e¤ects of punishment is the non-
material benets and costs of punishment. Following revealed-preference arguments, par-
ticipants who punish others do so because this gives them higher utility than not punishing.
At the same time, being punished (counter-punished) may be more costly than just the ma-
terial losses involved, because one may feel abused. The literature has largely adopted the
simplifying convention of only considering the material outcomes of the game and ignor-
ing any utility derived from punishment, payo¤ comparisons and other social motivations.
We follow this approach here in order for our analysis to be comparable to the literature,
and because trying to assess actual overall utility levels would require making assumptions
about the specic forms of the utility functions of participants, which at this point would
probably be gross simplications.
4 Conclusion
We have investigated whether peer punishment is an e¢ cient mechanism for promoting
cooperation in an environment that imposes minimal restrictions on the set of punishment
strategies available to individuals. In line with recent theoretical models (Boyd et al.,
2010; Janssen and Bushman, 2008; Rand et al., 2010; Rand and Nowak, 2011), we nd no
evidence of peer punishment increasing group earnings over time in such an environment,
despite allowing for interactions to occur over a long time horizon. Although the threat
of peer punishment helps maintain the initial levels of cooperation, the benets of higher
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cooperation are o¤set by the costs of punishment which remain high until the end of the
experiment, partly due to the ongoing feuds between group members.
The ine¢ cacy of peer punishment to increase group earnings in our environment rel-
ative to the treatment without punishment opportunities raises questions about whether
and under what conditions peer punishment can be an e¢ cient mechanism for upholding
cooperation in daily life. In many respects, the environment studied in our experiment is
a favorable one for the success of peer punishment. Individuals interact in small groups in
which monitoring and coordination of actions should be easier than in larger groups. Fur-
thermore, there is no uncertainty about the contributions of others (Ambrus and Greiner,
2012; Grechenig et al., 2010). In our experiment, group members are symmetric, a factor
that minimizes the problem of normative conict, which increases the cost of punishing free
riders (Nikiforakis et al., 2012; Reuben and Riedl, 2013). In addition, individuals interact
for an extended period of time which has been shown to make them more forward looking
(Gächter et al., 2008; Isaac et al., 1994).
In spite of these favorable conditions, peer punishment is not very e¤ective at increasing
group earnings in our setting that is more general and, arguably, more realistic than the
typical setting, which allows for a very limited set of punishment strategies. Our ndings
therefore may help explain why groups in daily life often adopt some form of hierarchy
and delegate the power to punish to a small number of group members (e.g., police, Head
of Department, senior partner in a rm, head of the family). This is not to imply that
there are no conditions under which peer punishment can be an e¢ cient mechanism for
promoting cooperation. Factors such as communication (Bochet and Putterman, 2009;
Masclet et al., forthcoming; Ostrom et al., 1992), punishment that is costless for the victim
(Masclet et al., 2003), endogenous selection of group members (Masclet, 2003; Putterman,
2005) and adoption of rules that govern group behavior (e.g., Putterman et al., 2011) are
likely to promote e¢ ciency. However, these factors may also interact with others. For
example, the ability to communicate and adopt common rules will be limited in larger or
asymmetric groups. Even if di¤erent factors can help make peer punishment e¤ective in
the long run, the time horizon may be too long. As Keynes suggested, people care about
their current state of a¤airs and not only what will happen in the long run. Hence, they
may favor delegation of punishment. We believe that these are all topics worthy of future
investigation.
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APPENDIX (FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION) 
 
Instructions for the Rich Punishment Treatment 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. If you read the following 
instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, earn a considerable amount 
of money. It is therefore important that you take your time to understand the instructions.  
 
The instructions which we have distributed to you are for your private information. 
Please do not communicate with the other participants during the experiment. 
Should you have any questions please raise your hand.  
  
During the experiment we shall not speak of Dollars, but of Experimental Currency Units 
(ECU). Your entire earnings will be calculated in ECUs. At the end of the experiment the 
total amount of ECUs you have earned will be converted to Dollars at the rate of 1 ECU 
= 6 cents and will be immediately paid to you in cash. In addition, we will give you a 
one-off payment of 150 ECU ($9.00).  
 
At the beginning of the experiment the participants will be randomly divided into groups 
of four. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants. The composition of 
each group will remain the same throughout the experiment.  
 
The experiment will last 30 periods. In the beginning of the experiment, after you are 
randomly divided into groups, each participant in your group will be randomly given 
a number for identification (i.e. Player 1, Player 2, Player 3, and Player 4). Each 
participant will keep this number throughout the experiment. Once the experiment is 
over the identities of each participant will be kept anonymous.  
 
Each of the 30 periods is divided into a number of stages. 
 
The first stage 
At the beginning of each of the 30 periods each participant will receive 20 ECU. In the 
following, we shall refer to this amount as the “endowment”. Your task in the first stage 
is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide how many of the 20 
ECUs you want to contribute to a project (from 0 to 20) and how many of them to 
keep for yourself. The consequences of your decision are explained in detail below.   
 
Once all the players have chosen their contribution to the project you will be informed 
about the group’s total contribution, your earnings from the project and your earnings at 
the end of the first stage. Your earnings at the end of the first stage are calculated using 
the following formula. If you have any difficulties do not hesitate to ask us.  
 
Earnings at the end of stage 1 = Endowment of ECUs - Your contribution to the Project 
   + 0.4*Total contribution to the Project 
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This formula shows that your earnings at the end of the first stage consists of two parts:  
1) The ECUs which you have kept for yourself (endowment – contribution) 
2) The earnings from the project, which equals to the 40% of the group’s total 
contribution. 
  
The earnings of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way. This 
means that each group member receives the same earnings from the project. Suppose the 
sum of the contributions of all group members are 60 ECUs. In this case, each member of 
the group receives earnings from the project of: 0.4*60=24 ECUs. If the total 
contribution to the project is 9 ECUs, then each member of the group receives earnings 
of: 0.4*9=3.6 ECUs from the project. 
  
You always have the option of keeping the ECUs for yourself or contributing them to the 
project. Each ECU that you keep raises your end of period earnings by 1 ECU. Supposing 
you contributed this ECU to the project instead, then the total contribution to the project 
would rise by 1 ECU. Your earnings from the project would thus rise by 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. 
However, the earnings of the other group members would also rise by 0.4 ECUs each, so 
that the total earnings of the group from the project would be increased by 1.6 ECUs. 
Your contribution to the project therefore also raises the earnings of the other group 
members. On the other hand you also gain earnings for each ECU contributed by the 
other members to the project. In particular, for each ECU contributed by any member you 
earn 0.4 ECUs. 
 
The second stage  
At the second stage you will be informed about how much each group member 
contributed individually to the project at the first stage. At this stage you can reduce or 
leave equal the earnings of each member of your group by distributing points. The 
other group members can also reduce your earnings if they wish to.   
 
To reduce another player’s earnings you will have to distribute points. Each point you 
distribute will cost you 1 ECU and will reduce the earnings of the person you assign it to 
by 3 ECU. If you choose 0 points for a particular group member, you do not change his 
or her earnings.  
 
Example: Suppose that you give 2 points to player 1. This costs you 2 ECU and reduces 
player 1’s earnings by 6 ECU.   
 
Your total earnings from the two stages is therefore calculated as follows: 
 
Total earnings (in ECUs) at the end of stage 2 = 
 
= Earnings from the 1st stage – 3*Points you receive – Points you give 
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Please note that your earnings in ECUs after the second stage can be negative. If your 
earnings are negative at the end of the period, this will be covered by the 150 ECU that 
we gave you in the beginning in order to pay this off. 
 
If none of the members of your group distributes points then the period finishes and the 
next period begins again with stage one. The period also finishes if none of the members 
of your group is allowed to assign further points. This will be explained below. 
Otherwise, a third stage will follow.   
 
The third stage 
In the third stage, you will be informed of the points that each person in your group 
assigned to you and the other members in your group. Similarly, the other members of 
your group will be informed about how many points you assigned to each of them. Then 
you can again reduce or leave equal the earnings of each member of your group by 
distributing points. The other group members can also again reduce your earnings if 
they wish to.   
 
Note that in order for someone to be able to assign points at this stage he or she must 
have at least 1 ECU (i.e. the cost of one point). Additionally, if one member has earnings, 
the others will not be able to reduce her earnings further. However, they will be able to 
reduce her earnings if at the beginning of the third stage her earnings are equal to zero.  
 
The costs of assigning points, as well as the earnings reduction caused by each point 
remain the same as before i.e. it costs you 1 ECU to assign a point and it reduces the 
recipient’s earnings by 3 ECU.  
 
Since a group member can only assign points if her current earnings are at least 1 ECU, 
the period ends when the earnings of all members of the group has been reduced to less 
than 1 ECU.  Furthermore, since it is not allowed to assign points to a member who 
already has negative earnings, the period ends if three players have  negative earnings, 
because the fourth player cannot assign points to them to reduce their earnings further. 
Hence the third stage will only be entered if after the second stage at least one player has 
1 ECU left and at least one other player has at least retained earnings of 0 (non-negative 
earnings) 
 
Fourth stage and beyond 
Your task in the forth stage and beyond is the same as in stage 3. After being informed 
of the points distributed in your group you will be able to assign further points. The 
costs of assigning points, as well as the earnings reduction caused by each point remain 
the same as before. The fourth, fifth, or any further stage will only be entered if at least 
one player assigned points in the previous stage and if at least one player can assign 
further points. 
 
 
 
 4
 
 
 
 
When does a period end? 
 
A period ends and a new one begins when one of the following occurs.  
- No points are distributed in a given stage. 
- Points are distributed, but no player would be allowed to assign any more points if 
another stage followed. This can happen if no player has at least 1 ECU left or if three 
players have negative earnings. 
 
Example: Assume that at the after the third stage, the earnings are as follows: 
Player 1: 2 ECU 
Player 2: 10 ECU 
Player 3: 3 ECU 
Player 4: 2 ECU 
 
Assume that in the fourth stage player 4 assigns 2 points to player 3 and no other player 
assigns points. Hence the earnings are  
Player 1: 2 ECU 
Player 2: 10 ECU 
Player 3: -3ECU (= 3 ECU – 2*3 ECU) 
Player 4: 0 ECU (=  2 ECU – 2 ECU)  
 
Since points were assigned in stage four and two players have positive earnings, a fifth 
stage follows. If in the fifth stage player 2 assign 4 points to player 1 and 1 point to player 
4, the earnings are  
 
Player 1: -10 ECU (= 2 ECU – 4*3 ECU) 
Player 2: 5ECU (= 10 ECU - 4 ECU – 1 ECU) 
Player 3: -3ECU  
Player 4: -3 ECU (=  0 ECU – 3*1 ECU)  
 
The period now ends, because only player 2 could assign more points, but because all 
other players have negative earnings, player 2 is not allowed to assign points to any of 
them. 
 
If you have any further questions please raise your hand and one of the supervisors will 
come to help you.  
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Control Questionnaire 
 
1. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. Nobody (including you) 
contributes any ECUs to the project. How high is: 
a. Your earnings after the first stage?  ……… 
b. The earnings of the other group members……… 
 
2. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. You contribute 20 ECUs to 
the project. All other group members contribute 20 ECUs each to the project. 
What is: 
a. Your earnings after the first stage?  ……… 
b. The earnings of the other group members?……… 
 
3. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. The other three group 
members contribute together a total of 30 ECUs to the project. What is: 
a. Your earnings after the first stage if you contribute 0 ECUs to the project? 
………. 
b. Your earnings at the end of the period if you contribute 15 ECUs to the 
project? ………. 
 
4. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. You contribute 8 ECUs to 
the project. What is: 
a. Your earnings after the first stage if the other group members together 
contribute a further total of 7 ECUs to the project?............... 
b. Your earnings after the first stage if the other group members together 
contribute a further total of 22 ECUs to the project?............... 
 
5. Your earnings from the first period is 25 ECU. How much will your earnings at 
the end of the second stage be if: 
a. You receive 2 points, but do not assign any yourself? ………….. 
b. You receive 2 points and assign 3 points yourself?.............. 
 
6. True or false: Each participant will be given an identification number which will 
allow others in their group to follow their actions in the experiment.  
 
                  True                 False  
 
7. Assume you assign 2 points to another group member, no one else in your group 
assigns any points and all members in your group have a positive earnings. Will 
another stage follow? 
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…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
8. Assume no member of your group assigns points including you. Will another 
stage follow? 
…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
 
Control Questionnaire Answers 
 
1. a) 20 ECU b) 20 ECU 
 
2. a) 32 ECU b) 32 ECU 
 
3. a) 32 ECU b) 23 ECU 
 
4. a) 18 ECU b) 24 ECU 
 
5. a) 19 ECU b) 16 ECU 
 
6. Yes. 
 
7. Yes 
 
8. No. 
 
